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This study examined value-added intentions by manipulating the cognitive frame
associated with monetary contingencies for detecting prospective memory (PM) cues.
We associated a loss-frame with a monetary punishment for failing to respond
to cues and a gain-frame with a monetary reward for remembering to respond
to cues and compared those frames to a no-frame control condition with no
contingency linked to performance. Across two experiments, we find increased PM
performance for participants in the loss-frame (Experiments 1 and 2) and in the gain-
frame (Experiment 2) conditions relative to the no-frame condition. This value-related
improvement in PM was not accompanied by a significant increase in cue monitoring
as measured by intention-induced interference to an ongoing task and recognition
memory for ongoing-task items. The few previous studies investigating motivational
PM showed mixed results regarding whether PM improves due to incentives or not.
Our results provide further evidence that, under some experimental conditions, PM
improves with rewards and that the benefit generalizes to penalizing performance.
The results have both practical implications and theoretical implications for motivation
models of PM.
Keywords: prospective memory, intention, motivation, value-added, loss, reward
Introduction
Prospective memory (PM) is a cognitive ability which enables individuals to remember to execute
an intended action plan at the appropriate moment in the future (e.g., Ellis and Kvavilashvili,
2000). Typical everyday examples of PM intentions include remembering to return a book to
the library on its due date or to file one’s tax return within the deadline. As evident from
these examples, PM intentions are likely to be forgotten entirely or delayed until a later time
in the future. On the one hand, PM failures may be associated with additional charges like
late fees or service fees. On the other hand on-time PM fulfillment may be rewarded with
monetary incentives, like an additional bonus for keeping the deadline. Such monetary charges
and rewards are meant to increase the motivation not to forget pending intentions but we are
unsure whether they are actually effective at increasing the likelihood of intention fulfillment. We
designed the present research to address this question and to develop a better understanding of
the general relationship between such motivational and cognitive processes in the PM domain.
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Einstein and McDaniel (1990) introduced a task set that
allows studying PM in the laboratory. At the outset of the
task, participants first form the action plan to execute a certain
action (e.g., to press a special key) in response to a target
cue which occurs during a later to-be-performed ongoing
task. After some distractor activity, participants then perform
the ongoing task and meanwhile they have to remember
on their own to fulfill the intended action in response to
PM cues. This task set is meant to simulate the typical PM
situation of being actively engaged in an ongoing activity
and nevertheless having to remember to fulfill intentions
at the appropriate moment. Critically, PM performance can
be measured as the proportion of correct responses to PM
cues. This task set has been used extensively to study the
cognitive processes underlying PM abilities. Based on findings
that successful PM performance often comes at a cost to
currently ongoing tasks (e.g., slowed responding; Marsh et al.,
2003; Smith, 2003), cognitive theories of PM assume that
attentional resources are regularly recruited to monitor the
environment for the occurrence of PM cues (McDaniel and
Einstein, 2000, 2007; Smith, 2003, 2010). According to a multi-
process view of PM, however, PM performance cannot only rely
on effortful attentional processing, but also on more effortless
processes when PM cues spontaneously triggers intention
retrieval (McDaniel and Einstein, 2000, 2007; Einstein et al.,
2005).
Whereas there is a large body of empirical studies
investigating the cognitive processes underlying PM, only
few studies have investigated motivational PM processes. This
lack of empirical investigation for how motivational states affect
PM is especially surprising because it is of high face validity
that the motivation to fulfill an intention may influence actual
intention fulfillment.
In an attempt to link motivational and cognitive PM
processing, Penningroth and Scott (2007) recently suggested
a goal-based motivational-cognitive model. According to this
framework, motivation to fulfill an intention increases whenever
an intention becomes relevant for one’s personal goals and
will therefore influence encoding, maintaining, and retrieving
of the intention. This argument is built on the idea that
people place a special cognitive effort on intentions that are
personally relevant, perhaps because goal-relevant intentions
are perceived as especially important. Perceived importance,
in turn, has been shown to affect PM fulfillment. In a
correlational diary study, Andrzejewski et al. (1991) found
that participants reported remembering more intentions that
they perceived as more important (see also Penningroth and
Scott, 2007). Similarly, experimental studies have shown PM
improvements when instructions stressed the importance of
the PM task relative to the ongoing task (Kliegel et al.,
2001, 2004). Often, these improvements come at the cost
of greater interference with the ongoing task (Smith and
Bayen, 2004; Marsh et al., 2005; Loft and Humphreys,
2012; see also Walter and Meier, 2014, for a comprehensive
review of importance effects). Important intentions seem
to induce a stronger engagement in effortful attentional
monitoring for PM cues when it is time to fulfill the intention
(i.e., described as late PM-processing stages; Penningroth and
Scott, 2007).
Further, the goal-based motivational-cognitive model
suggests that personal relevance of an intention can affect
intention encoding (i.e., described as early PM-processing
stages). In detail, goal-relevant intentions are assumed to become
better accessible in memory and/or to encourage the use of
better intention-encoding strategies. These early processes are
assumed to facilitate a spontaneous intention retrieval triggered
by the PM cue (cf. Einstein et al., 2005). In support of these
assumptions, Penningroth and Scott (2007) find that individuals
retrieved everyday intentions earlier in a recall test and also
used strategies more frequently, when intentions are personally
relevant. With a younger population, Somerville et al. (1983)
showed that children who had a high-interest intention to
remind their caretakers to purchase candy remembered to do
so more than those who had a low-interest intention to remind
their caretakers to retrieve the laundry. Thus, intentions with
high personal relevance seem to change motivation to remember
future intentions.
Empirical support for the assumptions that cues for goal-
relevant intentions are highly accessible comes from findings
that PM cues that are emotionally laden are better detected than
neutral cues without additional attentional effort (Clark-Foos
et al., 2009;Marsh et al., 2009; Altgassen et al., 2010; Schnitzspahn
et al., 2012) and that items that are related to personal goals have
a retrieval advantage (Förster et al., 2005; Penningroth and Scott,
2007).
The assumption that strategy use can indeed change later
PM processing is supported by research on implementation-
intention encoding strategies of PM. Implementation intentions
are specific when-then plans that associate an intention with an
action and are usually expressed in the form ‘‘When situation X
occurs, then I will perform response Y!’’ (Gollwitzer, 1999, p. 494).
The specificity of encoding these intentions, compared with less
specific encoding, improves PM performance in both laboratory
settings (Cohen and Gollwitzer, 2008; McDaniel et al., 2008)
and naturalistic settings (Liu and Park, 2004). Implementation
intentions benefit goal-striving behavior (Gollwitzer, 1999;
Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006), but the underlying cognitive
mechanisms for explaining the benefit have only recently
been better understood. One prevailing theory for this benefit
is that implementation-intention encoding encourages cue
accessibility and spontaneous retrieval (McDaniel et al., 2008;
McDaniel and Scullin, 2010). Another theory is that cue
detection for implementation-intentions results from stronger
engagement in attentional cue-monitoring (Meeks and Marsh,
2010; Zimmermann and Meier, 2010, for a similar finding)
Support for these theories, however, may be contingent
on the processing demands of the intention studied (e.g.,
whether cues are focal to the ongoing task or not). Rummel
et al. (2012) set out to test the cognitive underpinnings
of implementation intentions by using appropriate control
conditions and found evidence that both implementation-
intention encoding and increased cue-activation encoding
indeed foster spontaneous retrieval processes. This finding
might be relevant for the understanding of motivational PM
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processing, because according to Gollwitzer (1999), when
we engage goal-striving cognitive processing, remembering to
carry out important intentions improves. When not explicitly
instructed, the willingness to seek out goal-striving behaviors
spontaneously and engage in useful encoding processes (viz.,
implementation-intention or cue-activation encoding) may be
one of the motivational differences.
In sum, according to the goal-based motivational-cognitive
model suggested by Penningroth and Scott (2007), successful
PM performance is reflected by the cognitive processes that
operate throughout the PM task; the model does not seem to
argue whether effortful attentional or spontaneous processing is
necessarily better for PM performance, but it clearly suggests that
motivational PM processing can recruit both types of cognitive
processes to ensure good PM performance. Their model is
nice insofar as it incorporates research from the goal literature
(Kruglanski et al., 2002; Förster et al., 2005; Kruglanski and
Kopetz, 2009) as well as the PM literature already discussed,
especially in relation to the distinction between effortful vs.
effortless retrieval of intentions (Einstein and McDaniel, 2010;
Smith, 2010). Like Penningroth and Scott (2007), we believe that
motivational variables are important to consider when studying
PM both in the laboratory and in naturalistic settings and we find
their model to be fruitful in guiding motivation research on PM.
Since Penningroth and Scott (2007) introduced their model,
unfortunately very little experimental research has set out to test
and validate its predictions. One exception is a recent study by
Brandimonte et al. (2010) who showed that associating a PM
intention with the pro-social goal to ‘‘help the experimenter to
get good data’’ resulted in better PM performance compared
to a standard PM task (see also D’Angelo et al., 2012).
Another widely used method to increase personal relevance
of a task and thus to motivate good performance is to
change the value of the task (Atkinson, 1964). Typical value
manipulations are monetary punishments for bad performance
or rewards for good performance. Such manipulations have been
shown to improve performance in attention tasks (Hübner and
Schlösser, 2010; Wentura et al., 2014), encoding of episodic
memories (Shigemune et al., 2014), and even accessibility
of personal goals (Förster et al., 2005). Importantly, there
is empirical evidence that already small financial incentives
can change the motivation to perform a task (Locke and
Braver, 2008; Chiew and Braver, 2011; Marien et al., 2013,
2014).
There are also a few studies that have tested whether the
effects of rewards on some cognitive domains generalize to
PM performance (Furst, 1986; McCauley et al., 2009, 2011;
Brandimonte et al., 2010). McCauley et al. (2009) manipulated
monetary incentives to influence PM in a pediatric traumatic
brain injury (TBI) population. Participants in a low-motivation
condition could trade points earned by responding accurately to
PM cues for pennies, whereas participants in a high-motivation
condition could trade points for dollars. They found that the
high-motivation condition showed a greater benefit on PM
compared to the low-motivation condition; this benefit was
present in all groups of children with TBI. In a later study,
McCauley et al. (2011) used a different motivation manipulation
and found that participants with moderate TBI showed better
PM in the context of high-motivation (dollar incentive) relative
to a low-motivation (penny incentive); the greater incentive
did not help participants with severe TBI. These interesting
findings raise two important questions about incentives and PM.
First, improved PM for those with moderate, but not severe
TBI elevates the importance of whether motivation incentives
can improve PM for healthy individuals. Second, the lack of
a control condition in the McCauley et al. studies raises the
question about whether the low-motivation conditions improved
PM beyond having no incentive at all, especially for healthy
individuals. However, in the only study that used a reward
manipulation with a healthy student sample and used a no-
reward control condition, Brandimonte et al. (2010) found that
rewards in terms of extra course credit did not result in better
PM performance. In fact, the reward even reduced performance
in the pro-social condition, but not in the standard PM condition.
This deficit might be due to the reward changing the nature of
social relationships (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Heyman and
Ariely, 2004). Taken together, the results are mixed regarding
whether manipulation of the personal value of an intention
affects PM performance. Further, the goal of the first two
studies focused on providing remediation of PM impairments
for individuals TBI rather than outlining any potential cognitive
mechanism underlying motivational effects. None of these
three studies attempted to understand the cognitive dynamics
associated with improvements due to increased value of intention
fulfillment.
We assume that there are many reasons that motivate
individuals to come up with a certain intention in the first place
(cf. Kruglanski et al., 2002). The aim of the present research,
however, is not to investigate the motivation behind the selection
of a specific intention among all possible intentions but to
investigate differences in the motivational value of intention
fulfillment. Our reasoning is that the very same intention can
vary widely in personal value depending on the situation or
circumstances. The execution of an intention may sometimes be
of lower value (e.g., the intention to make a cup of coffee as part
of the breakfast routine) and sometimes of higher value (e.g.,
the intention to make a cup of coffee to wake oneself up after
a poor night’s sleep, making a cup of coffee to accommodate
guests who stayed over night). Our goal was to highlight the
role that such value added to an intention can play in encoding,
maintaining, or retrieving intentions. Although our study is
laboratory based, we assume many of the same, and likely
more, motivational influences will shape real-world intentions in
similar ways.
Scholars of PM have not yet developed any working theories
regarding the motivation involved in how we execute intentions
related to incentives. We have chosen to introduce the term
value-added intentions to identify a general class of intentions
that are associated with either the attainment or the forfeiture
of some entity or concept possessing some personal value
over and above the value of getting something done that one
had planned to do. In everyday life, such additional value
can come from intention-related rewards or penalties that are
either tangible or conceptual and have economic value as with
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money, points, or objects (e.g., gains or losses), social value (e.g.,
acceptance/praise or rejection/criticism), or physiological value
(e.g., hunger satiation or food deprivation).
In the laboratory, value-added intentions may be defined as
intentions that possess some value over and above the value of
being compliant with instructions. Such value-added intentions
can be realized by associating intention fulfillment or failure with
some kind of personal consequence for the participant.
We believe that value-added intentions can be distinguished
from standard intentions that are generally associated with
no consequence, so that there is no additional motivational
incentive to fulfill them. Perhaps value-added intentions operate
in much the same way as other intentions, which might
desensitize any appeal for investigating them in the laboratory.
Alternatively, value-added intentions may operate like important
intentions (which may or may not have consequential value)
and require more attentional resources (Smith and Bayen,
2004; Marsh et al., 2005). Finally, value-added intentions might
elicit better intention-encoding strategies and thus operate like
implementation intentions and automatize intention fulfillment
(Rummel et al., 2012) or render intention-related items more
accessible because they have a special meaning for the individual
(cf. Förster et al., 2005). Because the field of PM has not
studied value-added intentions in any depth, possible theories
that researchers develop about the processing of these intentions
are tentative and untested. The absence of compelling research
or guiding framework for value-added intentions does not seem
to be good reason for not studying intentions that have great
personal and economic impact.
Our goal of this set of experiments was to investigate how
individuals remember value-added intentions, which we chose to
study by associating intentions to financial gains and losses.
Experiment 1
Previous research has revealed favorable benefits of monetary
gains on PM for groups of participants with cognitive
impairments (McCauley et al., 2009, 2011). To our best
knowledge, however, no prior study has investigated the effects
of monetary incentives in healthy populations. In everyday
life, there are different types of intentions with monetary
consequences. Sometimes intention fulfillment is associated with
monetary rewards; sometimes intention failure is punished with
fees. As there is no prior research on the effects of financial
losses on PM, we started with examining whether associating
a financial loss with failing to remember an intention would
improve intention fulfillment in Experiment 1. In Experiment
2, we then additionally considered effects of financial gains
associated with successful intention fulfillment.
As an overview of the methodology, we used a standard
laboratory PM task setting with a lexical-decision task as ongoing
task and the PM task to respond to items containing a special
syllable by pressing a designated key on the keyboard. Further
we paid all participants prior to instruction, but manipulated
the cognitive frame associated with the payment. Participants
in the control condition (no-frame) received their payment
independent of their task performance, whereas participants in
the loss-frame condition received payment contingent on their
PM performance. Importantly, by paying all participants at the
outset of the experiment, we ensured that participants would
experience a PM-performance-contingent payment reduction as
a true loss of money they already possessed rather than as a lost
opportunity to gain money.1 In doing so, we aimed to create
a situation most similar to receiving a fee for PM failures as is
common outside the laboratory.
We can use the cognitive pathways outlined in the
motivational-cognitive model (cf. Penningroth and Scott, 2007,
Figure 1) to help guide some predictions about how value frames
might change goal relevance and ultimately PM processing.
According to the model, the loss frame might cause participants
to adopt different encoding strategies. Any observed PM
improvement associated with the loss frame would reveal
evidence for more automatic retrieval of the intention as
indicated either by equated, or even reduced, ongoing-task
costs. Similarly, increased intention values might foster intention
accessibility, which Penningroth and Scott propose would also
provide evidence for more automatic influences on PM. In
contrast, if the loss frame increases goal relevance by increasing
attentional effort toward the PM task relative to the no-frame
condition, they would expect an increase in PM accuracy, which
would also come at a performance cost to the ongoing task.
Method
Participants and Design
We recruited 66 student participants fromHeidelberg University
(mean age: 22.77; range: 18–35; 79% female) who were all
native speakers of German. We assigned an equal number
of participants randomly to two experimental conditions and
had them complete 30-min test sessions in groups with up
to six participants per session. We excluded from all analyses
one participant who did not follow task instructions and one
participant who received an incorrect amount of starting money
accidentally.
All participants received 4e starting money. In one condition
(loss-frame condition; n = 32), participants lost a certain
percentage of this money, whenever they forgot to press the
PM key in response to a PM cue. In the other condition (no-
frame control condition; n = 32), PM failures were not tied
to a monetary loss. PM performance was compared between
the two groups. We used the computer program G∗Power to
calculate the statistical power (Faul et al., 2007). The power to
detect medium-sized PM performance differences was moderate,
1 − β = 0.50. All participants performed two blocks of an
ongoing lexical-decision task; in the first block they performed
the ongoing task alone (baseline) and in the second block they
had an additional PM task to perform (PM block). This resulted
in a 2 by 2 mixed design for ongoing-task performance with the
1Although interesting questions could be asked about receiving payment vs.
not receiving payment, we decided to pay all participants in the experiments
in order to control for any effects of how payment itself changes the
approach to the task(s) (Heyman and Ariely, 2004). Thus, any effects of our
manipulation cannot be caused by the payment itself but by the increase in
the value of the intention.
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between-subjects factor condition (loss, control) and the within-
subjects factor block (baseline, PM block). The power to detect
loss-induced differences in changes in ongoing-task performance
from the baseline to the PM block of medium size was excellent,
1− β> 0.99.2
Materials and Procedure
For an ongoing lexical-decision task, 240 words of medium
length and frequency were taken from a word-norm German
database (Heister et al., 2011). We used half of the words to
create pronounceable nonwords by swapping one to two letters.
Importantly, these words and nonwords were restricted not to
contain the syllable ung because this syllable served as cue for
the PM task. For the PM task, 12 additional words of comparable
length and frequency with the syllable ung were taken from the
same database, 6 of which were transformed into nonwords. The
PM-cue words and nonwords were Haltung, Wirkung, ungefähr,
ungern, Zungen, Jungen, Sölung, Trüspung, Ungran, tungeln,
ungren, and Daunga.
Both experiments reported here were conducted in
accordance with national ethical guidelines. We recruited
participants from campus and promised them a chocolate
bar for their participation. After providing informed consent,
participants were seated in cubicles and in front of a computer
screen and then received an envelope containing 4e and a note
with either the number ‘‘1’’ or ‘‘2’’ on it from the experimenter.
The experimenter was not aware which number was in a
given envelope. The experiments’ starting screen prompted
participants to enter the number from the envelope and by
doing so participants assigned themselves to one of the two
experimental conditions (loss-frame, no-frame). Participants
were next asked to enter the amount of money they found in the
envelope and to then put the money and the note back in the
envelope and the envelope into a box which was located on the
side wall of the cubicle outside of participants’ field of view.
Next, all participants received instructions for the ongoing
lexical-decision task asking them to press the J-key for words
and the F-key for nonwords. Then, all participants performed
a baseline block of 80 lexical-decision trials. For this baseline
block, the computer software selected a random subset of 40
words and 40 non-words from the set of 240 word and nonword
items for each participant anew. Items were presented randomly
intermixed in white font on a black background. Each trial started
with a fixation cross of random duration (250–700 ms) followed
by an item which remained on the screen until participants
responded to it. A blank screen separated trials for 500 ms.
2In line with Penningroth and Scott (2007) motivational-cognitive model, we
assumed that our loss manipulation may increase the perceived importance
of the PM task, which, in turn, may result in an increase in cue monitoring
at a cost to the ongoing task. In previous studies, instructions stressing the
importance of the PM task yielded medium-sizes cost effects (e.g., Smith and
Bayen, 2004; Loft et al., 2008; Loft and Humphreys, 2012). Therefore, we
assumed an effect of medium-size in the population (i.e., f = 0.25; Cohen,
1968) for the present calculation of statistical power. Furthermore, because
the correlations between baseline RTs and PM-block RTs were r > 0.70 in
the two experiments reported here, we set the correlation among repeated
measures to 0.70 for the power analyses for costs in both experiments.
After the baseline block, participants received instructions
on the screen that they would perform another block of the
lexical-decision task later on. For this later block, all participants
received the additional PM-task instruction to respond to all
items (i.e., words and nonwords) containing the syllable ung
or Ung by pressing the hyphen-key (note that the hyphen-key
on the German QWERTZ keyboard is located at the position
of the slash-key on a QUERTY keyboard). Participants were
instructed that they should press the hyphen-key instead of the
word/nonword classification on ung-trials but that late hyphen-
key presses after having pressed another key would still be
counted as correct. At this point, all participants were also
informed that they would receive (some of) the money from
the envelope as additional compensation for their participation.
Only participants in the loss-frame condition, however, received
additional instructions that the money from the envelope was
the maximum amount of money (starting money) they could
receive and that they would lose some part of this money
whenever they forgot to press the hyphen-key for ung-items.
Importantly, participants were not informed how many ung-
items would occur during the task. Instead they were made
aware that their final compensation was contingent on their
overall performance in the PM task and that their starting money
would be proportionally reduced whenever they missed a ung-
item based on the percentage of cues they missed. To assure
that participants understood these instructions, they were further
informed that they could receive the complete amount of money
in the envelope if they never missed a ung-item but also lose all
the money if they never responded to a ung-item correctly. In the
control, condition participants were simply informed that they
would receive the money from the envelope after the experiment.
Participants of both conditions then answered trivia questions
for 4 min to delay the PM task. After this filler task, participants
performed the second lexical-decision-task block with the
embedded PM task (PM block). This block comprised 172 trials
in total; 80 word trials and 80 nonword trials, to which the
remaining 160 items from the item set were assigned randomly,
as well as 12 PM trials. PM trials occurred on fixed positions
for all participants (i.e., on Trials 20, 30, 43, 55, 66, 80, 92, 105,
116, 128, 138, and 150) and ung-items were assigned randomly
to these trials.
After the PM block, participants’ memory for the PM cues
(syllable ung) and the PM key (hyphen-key) was probed. Finally,
participants were debriefed and received the chocolate bar
promised to them when they were recruited and the monetary
compensation, which was promised to them in the course of
the experiment. For participants in the loss-frame condition,
monetary compensation was proportionally reduced contingent
on their PM performance.
Results and Discussion
We set an alpha-level to 0.05 for all analyses. We further report
Bayes factors (BF) for those results that are most critical for our
conclusions. In line with conventions, we applied the JZS prior
(Jeffreys, 1961). Note that we report BF in favor of the evidence
(i.e., BF for the alternative hypothesis (BF10) when evidence is in
favor of differences and BF for the Null hypothesis (BF01) when
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evidence is in favor of no difference). Thus, BF values greater
than one always reflect our interpretation of the data.
Prospective-Memory Performance and Intention
Memory
The proportion of correct responses to PM cues was used to
assess PM performance. Any hyphen-key press between PM cue
onset and the offset of the probe stimulus on the following trial
was counted as a correct PM response. See Table 1 for means and
standard errors.
An independent-samples t-test was used to compare PM
performance between the loss-frame and the no-frame condition.
This test showed that PM performance in the loss-frame
condition (M = 0.79; SE = 0.04) was significantly better than in
the no-frame condition (M = 0.65; SE = 0.05), t(62) = 2.03, d =
0.52, p = 0.047 (BF10 = 1.42).3 To our best knowledge, this result
is the first empirical demonstration that anticipated monetary
losses associated with a PM failure can cause PM improvements.
All participants were able to recall the PM key after the
experiment. Only two participants were unable to recall the
PM cue and these two participants nevertheless made at least
one correct PM response during the ongoing task. Therefore,
PM encoding failures or retrospective forgetting of the PM task
cannot account for the present findings.
Ongoing-Task Performance
Lexical-decision error-rates and response times (RTs) were used
to assess ongoing task performance (see Table 1 for means and
standard errors).
Error rates were submitted to a 2× 2 mixed-model analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with the between-subjects factor condition
(loss-frame, no-frame) and the within subjects-factor block
(baseline, PM block). There were neither significant main effects
nor an interaction for error rates, all Fs < 1.6. This result is not
surprising because error rates were near ceiling in all conditions,
which is typical when using a lexical-decision task as ongoing task
(cf. Brewer, 2011).
RT analyses were confined to correct responses and the first
four trials as well as the four trials after a PM trial were excluded
to account for artificial costs or after-effects associated with these
trials (Brewer, 2011; Meier and Rey-Mermet, 2012). Responses
faster than 300 ms and slower than two standard deviations
above the individual mean were excluded. RTs were trimmed
separately for each block and item type (word, nonword). RTs
were then submitted to a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA with
the between-subjects factor condition (loss-frame, no-frame) and
the within subjects-factors block (baseline, PM block), and item
type (word, nonword). This analysis showed a non-significant
trend of generally slower RTs in the loss-frame (M = 1016;
SE = 64) than in the no-frame condition (M = 862; SE = 64),
F(1,62) = 2.97, f = 0.22, p = 0.090. Further there was a main
3Although conventional significance testing suggested a reliable difference
between conditions, the Bayesian analysis suggests that this difference was
rather anecdotal (i.e., BF was smaller than 3; Jeffreys, 1961). However, we
found reliable support for our hypothesis that a loss frame improves PM from
both conventional and Bayesian analyses in Experiment 2 with an improved
method (see below). Therefore, we believe that this effect is trustworthy.
effect of block, F(1,62) = 30.99, fz = 0.27, p < 0.001,4 indicating
that responses were generally faster in the baseline (M = 860;
SE = 48) compared to the PM block (M = 1018; SE = 46). This
result is in line with the typical finding that the addition of
the resource-demanding PM task comes at a cost to performing
the ongoing task (Einstein and McDaniel, 2010). We cannot
rule out that the main effect of block might have been due to
a general fatigue effect (Smith, 2010), but the present design
was tailored to test for differences in task interference due to
a monetary loss associated with PM failures. In this regard,
the critical finding is that the trending effect of condition and
the effect of block were not further qualified by an interaction
between condition and block, F(1,62) = 1.48, fz = 0.06, p = 0.229.
Notably, this interaction test had a very high statistical power
and the non-significant finding can be seen as evidence that
the differences in PM performance between the loss-frame and
the no-frame condition were not accompanied by equivalent
differences in the engagement in PM monitoring. For a better
illustration of these findings, we computed difference scores by
subtracting baseline RTs from PM-block RTs (see Smith and
Bayen, 2004, for a similar approach). The cost difference scores
were numerically higher in the loss-frame condition than in the
control condition for both words and nonwords (see Table 1).
However, the differences in PM-induced costs between the two
conditions were not statistically reliable for either words, t < 1
(BF01 = 3.15), or nonwords, t(62) = 1.48, d = 0.38, p = 0.143
(BF01 = 1.55).
The only other significant result was a main effect of item
type, F(1,62) = 28.23, fz = 0.26, p < 0.001. This finding shows that
participants responded to words (M = 878; SE = 43) faster than
to nonwords (M = 1002; SE = 49) which is also a typical finding
when using lexical-decision tasks (all other Fs< 1.1).
In sum, results of Experiment 1 are the first demonstration
that monetary punishment of PM failures is effective in
improving PM performance. There was no reliable support,
however, for the hypothesis that these PM improvements are
accompanied by higher engagement in effortful PM processing
as reflected by higher PM-induced costs.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 revealed that framing PM forgetting in terms of a
loss increased PM performance, but this benefit was not offset
by a significant increase in response latencies on the ongoing
4For within-subjects effects and between/within-subjects interactions,
calculations of Cohen’s f, which was originally defined for between-subjects
designs, are inflated estimates of the true effect size in the population
when applying the usual conventions suggested by Cohen (1968). This is
due to the fact that inter-individual variance is controlled for in within-
subjects error terms (Erdfelder, personal communication). We therefore
report fz =
√(
f 2 × N− kN × m− 1m × (1− r)
)
as effect-size estimates for all
within-effects and between/within-subjects interactions. Note that k is the
number of levels of the between-subjects factor, m is the number of levels of
the within-subjects factor, and r is the correlation between repeatedmeasures.
Effect-sizes f z can be interpreted according to the usual conventions that refer
to the between-subjects error term (i.e., f z = 0.25 would indicate a medium-
sized effect; Cohen, 1968).
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TABLE 1 | Prospective-memory and ongoing task performance in Experiment 1.
PM Performance Ongoing-Task Performance
PM Hit Rates Error Rates Word RTs Nonword RTs
Loss
Baseline 0.034 (0.007) 854 (92) 986 (82)
PM Block 0.79 (0.04) 0.030 (0.003) 1042 (70) 1184 (86)
PM Costs −0.004 (0.005) 188 (55) 198 (55)
Control
Baseline 0.039 (0.006) 733 (36) 867 (64)
PM Block 0.65 (0.05) 0.034 (0.005) 878 (45) 970 (58)
PM Costs −0.005 (0.005) 144 (25) 103 (32)
Note. PM = Prospective memory, RT = response time in ms. Baseline = first block without PM task, PM Block = second block with PM task. For the PM Costs measure,
performance in the baseline block was subtracted from performance in the second block. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
task. Our results are intriguing because they seem to show that
certain framing manipulations (i.e., a loss frame) can potentially
increase PM. Furthermore, these PM improvements are unlikely
to be fully explained by an additional allocation of attention
to the PM task, because, despite good statistical power, the
small numerical loss-induced increase in costs to the ongoing
task was not significant. Because this experiment is the first
to show this finding, we believe it prudent to replicate this
finding.
In order to better understand how individuals fulfill value-
added intentions, we decided to broaden our framemanipulation
by adding a gain-frame condition to the design. Previous
investigations of monetary incentives on PM (McCauley et al.,
2009, 2011) did not investigate the attentional demands of
intentions using monetary incentives. There is reason to believe
that improved PM performance using a gain-frame might be
due to greater allocations of attention toward the intention
itself. Numerous studies have found slowing on an ongoing
task when paired with fulfilling various types of intentions
(Marsh et al., 2003; Smith, 2003, 2010). Although this attentional
tradeoff may not be important for questions designed to improve
PM for patients with TBI, understanding attentional demands
might be relevant for intentions that are maintained or carried
out in more fast-paced or attention-demanding environments
(e.g., hospitals, air traffic control, driving, etc.; cf. Dismukes,
2012; Grundgeiger et al., 2014) and also in everyday life where
maintaining good ongoing task performance without forgetting
intentions is crucial. Critically, cases of everyday intentions
are also qualified by incentives or disincentives. We often
have intentions to cash a sizable tax return or to retrieve
a paycheck from our boss. In contrast, we may also need
to remember to pay a bill before a due date or we may
need to return money borrowed from a friend. Certainly,
there are some qualitative differences between these sets of
example intentions. The former two intentions involve gaining
access to money not otherwise endowed and the latter two
involve parting with money currently held. Research in other
cognitive domains has shown that people process information
differently based on whether a cognitive frame is a gain or
a loss (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Shah et al., 1998).
Therefore, it may be also of theoretical interest to test whether
loss and gain frames have differential effects on value-added
intentions.
Beyond these applied implications, a basic question
concerning the role of effortful PM processing for value-
added intentions is of theoretical interest. As our first study
might not have been optimal in this regard, we made some
procedural changes for the second experiment.
One potential limitation of Experiment 1 is that participants
in the no-frame condition could have interpreted the payment
they received as some financial gain (reward) for detecting
PM cues. If this assumption were true, the difference in PM
accuracy between the no-frame and the loss-frame conditions
could be interpreted in ways other than we postulate. For
example, if participants interpreted the no-frame condition as
a gain, Experiment 1 might reveal differences between gaining
and losing money. In that case, an unanticipated perception
of gaining money for those in the no-frame condition would
indicate that paying participants actually reduced performance
relative to losing money, perhaps because of reduced motivation
(see Brandimonte et al., 2010). Alternatively, if participants
perceived payment in a general sense and unrelated to PM
specifically, the increased performance for the loss-frame
condition would indicate losing money changed performance in
a positive way. Adding a ‘‘true’’ gain-frame condition, however,
should eliminate ambiguity about the results.
Evidence against the criticism just raised is that several
participants of Experiment 1 also told the experimenter after
the experiment that they thought that the information about
monetary incentives was fictional and that they were surprised
that they actually got paid. We did not consider asking this
question, so we cannot provide an accurate representation of
this outcome. The reason for this assumption seemed to be
that during recruitment we told participants that they would
get a chocolate bar for participating, but we made no mention
of compensation. Because this confusion likely weakened the
effect of the loss manipulation, participants of Experiment 2 were
informed during recruitment that they would receive a monetary
compensation for their participation and that compensation
could vary depending on their performance.
Furthermore, we made three experimental changes to this
experiment. Two additional tasks were applied after the PM
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task to shed light on the processes underlying the loss-induced
PM benefits. One task was a surprised recognition test for
ongoing-task items of the PM block. The idea behind this
task is that a more careful ongoing-task processing under the
loss-frame (and eventually also a gain-frame) conditions should
be reflected by better item recognition (see Loft and Humphreys,
2012, for a similar task and rationale). The other additional
task was a Go/No-Go task in which go and no-go trials were
indicated by two different font colors. The response key for
go-responses was the hyphen-key (which served as PM key in
the previous lexical-decision task) and the probe stimuli were
the PM cues as well as some neutral ongoing-task items from
the previous lexical-decision task. With this additional task, we
aimed to test whether the intention becomes more accessible for
participants in the frame condition compared to the no-frame
control condition. As the intention during the preceding lexical-
decision task was to respond to PM cues with the hyphen-key,
faster responses on PM-cue go-trials compared to neutral-item
go-trials in the frame conditions relative to the no-frame would
indicate that the intention (i.e., press hyphen-key for PM cues) is
more accessible in these conditions (cf. Förster et al., 2005, for a
similar rationale). Based on this rationale, one could even expect
more no-go errors on PM-cue no-go trials than on neutral-items
no-go trials. This modification helped us to address whether
value adding manipulations might increase the accessibility of
the intention, a component of the Penningroth and Scott (2007)
model. Finally, after completing the experiment, participants
indicated the importance of the ongoing task and the PM
task to test whether perceived importance of the two tasks
would change with the value frame. These questions were also
inspired by the Penningroth and Scott model which assumes
that motivation-induced PM improvements are due to higher
perceived importance of goal-related intentions.
Method
Participants and Design
Eighty-five students from Heidelberg University (mean age:
22.60; range: 18–32; 79% female) who were all native speakers
of German participated for monetary compensation. Participants
were assigned randomly to three experimental conditions with
the constraint that participants were distributed equally between
conditions. One participant who did not follow task instructions
and one participant who was unable to recall the PM cue and
the PM key in the intention memory test and additionally never
made a correct PM response were excluded from all analyses.
As in Experiment 1, all participants performed two blocks
(baseline, PM block) of an ongoing task and the between-
subjects manipulation was applied after the first block.
In one experimental condition, PM failures were punished
with monetary losses (loss-frame condition; n = 27). In a
second condition, successful PM fulfillment was rewarded
with a monetary gain (gain-frame condition; n = 28). The
third condition was a control condition in which monetary
compensation for participation was not tied to PM performance
(no-frame condition; n = 28). The statistical power to detect
medium-sized PM performance differences was moderate,
1− β = 0.50. The statistical power to detect medium-sized
differences in ongoing-task performance changes from the
baseline to the PM block, however, was excellent, 1− β> 0.99.
Materials and Procedure
Materials were the same as in Experiment 1. Participants were
again recruited on campus. This time, however, participants
were informed already at recruitment that they would receive a
monetary compensation for their participation which would vary
between 5e and 9e contingent on their performance. When
entering the laboratory, participants were seated in cubicles and
then first participated in an unrelated questionnaire study for
20 min before they started with the 30-min PM experiment.
As in Experiment 1, participants provided informed
consent and then received lexical-decision task instructions
and performed a baseline block first. For the PM block,
participants received the same additional PM instructions as in
Experiment 1. After PM instructions, participants were asked
to take an envelope from the box at the side wall. There were
different envelope versions for the three conditions. As in
Experiment 1, the envelope versions for the loss and control
conditions contained 4e and a note with the number ‘‘2’’ or ‘‘3’’,
respectively. For the gain-frame condition, the envelope only
contained a note with the number ‘‘1’’; the envelope contained
no money. Participants were prompted to enter the number
and the amount of money they found in the envelope on the
computer screen. By entering the number, participants assigned
themselves to the experimental conditions thus experimenters
were blind to which condition a given participant was assigned.
Participants were then asked to put the note and money back
into the envelope and the envelope back into the box. Next,
participants were informed about the money they could possibly
earn and this information varied with conditions. In the loss-
frame condition, participants were informed that they would
receive the additional 4e from the envelope in addition to the
5e basic payment, but they would lose a certain percentage
of this money contingent on the percentage of ung-items they
would miss. In the gain-frame condition, participants were
told that they could earn up to 4e in addition to the basic
payment of 5e and would gain a certain percentage of money
contingent on the percentage of ung-items they would respond
to correctly. In the no-frame control condition, participants were
simply told that they would receive the 4e from the envelope
in addition to the basic payment of 5e as compensation for
their participation. After a filler task (cf. Experiment 1), all
participants performed the PM block, which was identical to the
one used in Experiment 1.
After finishing the PMblock, participants were presented with
a surprise recognition test for ongoing-task items. For this task,
20 items (half words, half nonwords) were chosen randomly from
the body of items presented in the PM block of the ongoing task
and 20 new items (half words, half nonwords) that matched the
other items on both usage frequency and letter length were drawn
from the same database (Heister et al., 2011). None of these items
contained the PM-cue syllable. Items appeared sequentially in a
random order. For each item, participants indicated whether it
had occurred during the lexical-decision task or not.
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All participants also performed a Go/No-Go task in which
the 12 PM cues and 12 neutral ongoing-task items from the PM
block served as probe stimuli. Stimuli for this task appeared in
a random order and initially in white font color until 500 ms
had elapsed and the color changed to either blue or green.
Participants’ task was to press the PM key (hyphen-key) as fast
as possible when the font color turned to blue (or green), but not
to respond when it turned to green (or blue). The assignment
of colors to Go/No-Go responses within each condition was
approximately counterbalanced. The proportion of go relative to
no-go trials was 2:1. There was a window of 1500 ms to respond
to a stimulus and the inter-trial interval was 1000 ms.
After the Go/No-Go task, participants had to recall the PM
cue and the PM key and were asked to indicate (on a scale from
0 to 100) how important they perceived the lexical-decision task
while performing the PM block; how important they perceived
the PM task while performing the PM block; and how important
they perceived the PM task relative to the lexical-decision task
(0 = only lexical-decision task important; 100 = only PM task
important). Finally, participants received the promised monetary
compensation and were debriefed and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
Prospective-Memory Performance and Intention
Memory
As evident from Table 2, PM performance of Experiment 2
was generally better than Experiment 1. This benefit might
be due to the fact that all participants were promised
monetary compensation for participation when they were
recruited. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA comparing PM
performance between the loss-frame, gain-frame, and no-frame
conditions indicated that PM performance varied significantly
with conditions, F(2,80) = 6.66, f = 0.41, p < 0.002. Post hoc
tests further revealed that PM performance in both the loss-
frame (M = 0.93; SE = 0.02) and in the gain-frame (M = 0.93;
SE = 0.02) conditions was significantly better than in the no-
frame condition (M = 0.77; SE = 0.05), both ps = 0.002 (both
BF10 > 5.39). PM performance between the loss-frame and the
gain-frame conditions did not differ, p = 0.993 (BF01 = 3.68).
Thus, results of Experiment 2 replicated the central finding
of Experiment 1 that anticipated monetary losses associated
with PM failure can result in PM improvements. Furthermore,
results suggest that PM performance also benefits frommonetary
rewards associated with PM fulfillment (see also McCauley
et al., 2009, 2011). This finding stands in contrast to previous
studies in which successful PM fulfillment was also bound to
a personal reward but did not result in any PM improvements
in a healthy population (Brandimonte et al., 2010). We will
discuss differences between these studies and ours in the General
Discussion section.
All participants apart from one excluded person (see above)
were able to recall the PM-cue syllable and the PM key in the
intentionmemory test. Thus, the present PMperformance results
were not contaminated by PM encoding failures or retrospective
forgetting of the PM task.
Ongoing-Task Performance
Mean error rates and RTs (trimmed as before) are displayed in
Table 2. For accuracy, the 3 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA with the
between-subjects factor condition (loss, gain, no-frame) and the
within subjects-factor block (baseline, PM block) for error rates
did not show a significant main effect or interaction, all Fs< 1.5.
For RTs, the 3 × 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA with the
between-subjects factor condition (loss, gain, no-frame) and
the within subjects-factors block (baseline, PM block) and item
type (word, nonword) for RTs did not show a main effect
of condition, F(2,80) = 2.09, f = 0.23, p = 0.130. Replicating
findings from Experiment 1, however, there was a main effect
of block, F(1,80) = 102.41, fz = 0.50, p < 0.001, indicating that
responses were generally faster in the baseline block (M = 851;
SE = 36) compared to the PM block (M = 1049; SE = 36). The
main effect of item type was also significant, F(1,80) = 75.94,
fz = 0.43, p < 0.001, showing that responses to words (M = 898;
SE = 36) were generally faster than to nonwords (M = 1003;
SE = 36). Despite the very good statistical power, there was
once again no indication of a significant interaction between
TABLE 2 | Prospective-memory and ongoing task performance in Experiment 2.
PM Performance Ongoing-Task Performance
PM Hit Rates Error Rates Word RTs Nonword RTs
Loss
Baseline 0.016 (0.004) 790 (48) 921 (60)
PM Block 0.93 (0.02) 0.016 (0.004) 983 (46) 1109 (53)
PM costs <0.001 (0.003) 193 (32) 188 (37)
Gain
Baseline 0.024 (0.005) 857 (78) 972 (90)
PM Block 0.93 (0.02) 0.020 (0.003) 1116 (97) 1197 (81)
PM costs −0.004 (0.004) 260 (42) 225 (49)
Control
Baseline 0.024 (0.004) 739 (39) 830 (44)
PM Block 0.76 (0.05) 0.024 (0.004) 899 (40) 988 (47)
PM costs 0.001 (0.005) 160 (30) 158 (32)
Note. PM = Prospective memory, RT = response time in ms. Baseline = first block without PM task, PM Block = second block with PM task. For the PM costs measure,
performance in the baseline block substracted from performance in the second block. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
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TABLE 3 | Ongoing task item recognition performance and perceived task importance in Experiment 2.
Ongoing-Task-Item Recognition Importance Estimates
Hit Rates False-Alarm Rates Pr OT PM OT/PM
Words Nonwords Words Nonwords Words Nonwords
Loss 0.70 (0.04) 0.68 (0.04) 0.40 (0.03) 0.21 (0.03) 0.38 (0.04) 0.47 (0.05) 80 (4) 91 (3) 58 (3)
Gain 0.76 (0.04) 0.71 (0.03) 0.41 (0.04) 0.17 (0.03) 0.34 (0.05) 0.54 (0.03) 75 (5) 93 (2) 65 (3)
Control 0.71 (0.04) 0.68 (0.04) 0.39 (0.03) 0.16 (0.02) 0.33 (0.04) 0.51 (0.04) 83 (4) 91 (2) 56 (3)
Note. Pr = hit rate—false alarm rate, OT = ongoing task, PM = prospective memory, PM/OT = importance of the prospective-memory task relative to the ongoing task.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
condition and block, F(2,80) = 1.57, fz = 0.09, p = 0.214. All
other interactions were also not significant, all Fs< 1. To further
investigate potential differences in the engagement in attentional
monitoring between experimental conditions, we once again
computed difference scores by subtracting baseline RTs from
PM-block RTs (see Table 2) which reflect PM-induced costs.
We then compared costs in both the gain and loss condition
with costs in the control condition. When comparing the gain
with the control condition, we found a non-significant trend of
an gain-related cost increase for words, t(54) = 1.95, d = 0.53,
p = 0.057 (BF10 = 1.42) but not for nonwords, t(54) = 1.15,
d = 0.31, p = 0.255 (B01 = 2.38). When comparing the loss
with the control condition, no evidence was found for a loss-
related cost increase for neither words or nonwords, both ts
< 1 (both BF01 > 2.92). Pooling together both the gain and
loss conditions also revealed no support for greater interference
compared to the control condition, both ts(81) < 1.56, with
support in favor of equated performance rather than differences
(both B01 > 1.48). Thus, there was again no strong empirical
support for the hypothesis that the PM improvements due
to PM-performance contingent monetary losses or gains were
accompanied by an increase in PM monitoring as reflected by
PM-induced costs.
Ongoing-Task-Item Recognition
To assess retrospective memory for items that previously
occurred during the PM block of the ongoing task, we calculated
proportions of those words and nonwords which had been
occurred during the ongoing task and that were correctly
classified as ‘‘being from the ongoing task’’ (recognition hit rates)
as well as the proportions of those words and nonwords that
had not been occurred previously but were classified incorrectly
as ‘‘being from the ongoing task’’ (recognition false-alarm rates)
for each participant. To consider both hit rates and false-alarm
rates simultaneously, we then computed a discrimination index
(Pr = hit rates− false-alarm rates; Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988).
Pr, recognition hit rates, and recognition false alarm rates were
then submitted to separate 3 × 2 mixed-model ANOVAs with
the between-subjects factor condition (loss, gain, no-frame) and
the within subjects factor item type (word, nonword). See Table 3
for means and standard errors.
The analysis of Pr only revealed a significant effect of item
type, F(1,80) = 22.93, fz = 0.23, p < 0.001, both other Fs < 1.2.
This pattern of results indicates that participants were generally
better able to discriminate between previously presented and
new nonwords (M = 0.51; SE = 0.02) than between previously
presented and new words (M = 0.35; SE = 0.03), but the loss and
gain conditions did not change discrimination rates. A similar
pattern of results was found when analyzing hit rates and false
alarm rates, separately. These results further corroborate the
conclusion drawn based on the non-significant ongoing-task
RT results that monetary punishment or rewards did not cause
stronger engagement in PM monitoring or a more careful PM-
cue checking compared to the control condition.
Go/No-Go Performance
Only very few participants made errors in the Go/No-Go task
and therefore we refrained from analyzing error rates of this
task. Instead we focused on the analysis of RTs on go trials. A
3 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA with the between-subjects factor
condition (loss, gain, no-frame) and the within-subjects factor
item type (word, nonword) and critical item (PM cue, neutral)
for RTs did not reveal a significant main effect nor interaction,
all Fs< 2. Thus the results of the Go/No-Go task did not support
the assumption that the loss and gain conditions strengthened
the accessibility of the intention.
Perceived Task Importance
Absolute importance estimates for the ongoing task and the
PM task as well as estimates of the importance of the PM
task relative to the ongoing task were analyzed to test whether
perceived PM-task importance changed as a function of a loss or
gain-frame (see Table 3 for means). One-way ANOVAs for the
perceived absolute ongoing-task importance and the perceived
absolute PM-task importance revealed no significant differences
between conditions, both Fs < 1. Estimates of relative PM-
task importance, however, varied significantly with conditions,
F(2,80) = 3.13, f = 0.28, p = 0.049. Pairwise comparisons further
revealed that the perceived relative PM-task importance in the
loss-frame (M = 58; SE = 3) did not differ from the one in
the no-frame condition (M = 56; SE = 3), p = 0.557, whereas
the perceived relative importance in the gain-frame condition
(M = 65; SE = 3) differed from the no-frame condition, p = 0.018.
There was further a trend for a higher perceived relative PM
task importance in the gain-frame compared to the loss-frame
condition, p = 0.077.
In sum, these results imply that PM-performance
improvements due tomonetary punishments were not associated
with changes in perceived PM-task importance whereas PM-
performance improvements due to monetary rewards were
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 278
Cook et al. Motivation and prospective memory
accompanied by an increase in the perceived importance of the
PM task relative to the ongoing task.
General Discussion
In two experiments, we manipulated cognitive frames related
specifically to the value of fulfilling an event-based intention.
We found an increase in PM performance for participants
assigned to a loss-frame condition (Experiments 1 and 2)
and to a gain-frame condition (Experiment 2) relative to
participants in a no-frame control condition who also received
payment for their participation, but for whom payment was not
contingent on PM performance. The increase in PM for the
two framing conditions was not associated with a significant
increase in costs to the ongoing task. Importantly, improved
PM for our gain frame replicates previous research on the
benefits of monetary incentives on PM in cognitively-impaired
participants (McCauley et al., 2009, 2011) with a sample of
healthy participants and extends that research by making the
novel finding that monetary losses associated with intentions
can also improve PM performance. The generality of the
finding suggests that value-added intentions have a general
processing advantage. As mentioned earlier, Brandimonte et al.
(2010) investigated the value of intentions in healthy adults
and found that internal social rewards but not external rewards
(in terms of additional partial course credit) improved PM.
This discrepancy might be due to the different type of value-
manipulation used in our study. That is, participants might
value our monetary losses and gains higher than course-credit
rewards. Furthermore, in our studies we clarified via instructions
that every (in-)correct PM response would proportionally
affect the final outcome. Brandimonte et al. however, were
less specific in this regard by just telling participants that
they would receive extra credit when they remembered to
perform the PM task. Thus, their participants may have
assumed that they would not receive the extra credit after
having missed one cue and this could have reduced their
motivation to respond to cues from then on. After all, rewards
can influence goal-setting differently when allocated according
to a piece-rate system with an opportunity to earn partial
rewards regardless of overall goal achieved compared with a
bonus system that is contingent only upon meeting a specified
benchmark (Mowen et al., 1981). They also found that the
outcome also interacts with the difficulty of achieving the goal
such that effort increases with task difficulty for piece-rate
rewards, but decreases for bonus-based rewards. This finding
may account for the differences between studies, especially if
our task was more demanding than that used by Brandimonte
et al. (2010). This same pattern of results, however, might
not hold for intentions associated with avoiding losses or
late fees.
The finding that value-added intentions have a higher
likelihood of being fulfilled than regular intentions is of high
practical relevance. First, it is empirical support that late fees
for PM failures (e.g., additional charges for late payments) or
incentives for on-time PM fulfilment (e.g., health-insurance
refunds for having a dentist check-up once a year) can indeed
improve PM performance and apparently even without causing
greater costs to one’s ongoing tasks. A practical implication
thus might be that a usage of PM-associated punishments
and rewards is warranted especially in domains where PM
failures are crucial or even fatal (Grundgeiger et al., 2010;
Dismukes, 2012). Furthermore, investigating whether certain
populations such as children (Zimmermann and Meier, 2006;
Maylor and Logie, 2010; Kliegel et al., 2013) or older adults
(Zimmermann and Meier, 2006; Kliegel et al., 2008) who tend to
have difficulties remembering intentions also benefit from value-
added intentions.
The present findings of value-induced PM improvements
in a fairly demanding PM task (syllable intention) that were
accompanied by a rather small numerical increase in costs
that was not statistically reliable, and is thus unlikely to fully
explain the observed PM improvements, is challenging for
current theorizing of PM. According to the proposed pathways
of the motivational-cognitive model (Penningroth and Scott,
2007), goal relevance can facilitate effortless PM retrieval and/or
change the engagement in effortful PM processing. Based on
our manipulations, the model would predict that both the
gain and loss frames could lead to early processing changes
in the intention encoding that could result in changes to
strategy use or to the accessibility of intentions, both of
which would foster effortless intention retrieval. Alternatively,
their model predicts the frames could lead to later processing
changes in the allocation of attention to the PM task, which
would always lead to higher costs to the ongoing task.
When placed in the context of this model, improved PM
performance for our frame conditions that were accompanied
by neither substantially higher costs to the ongoing task
(Experiments 1 and 2) nor by better recognition memory
for neutral ongoing-task items (Experiment 2) appears to
be partially consistent with the predictions of an effortless
retrieval route. Based on our data from the Go/No-Go task
of Experiment 2, we do not believe that the PM benefit was
due to increased intention accessibility because we did not
find any evidence that the presentation of PM critical items
(i.e., items that served as PM cues in the preceding lexical-
decision task) elicited faster go-responses or more commission
errors in this test than neutral items in this test. Within the
framework of the motivational-cognitive model (Penningroth
and Scott, 2007) this leaves us with the final option that
the value manipulation changed encoding-strategy use. There
is some difficulty in assessing this explanation fully because
Penningroth and Scott’s model does not specify which kind
of strategy increased PM motivation should elicit. Finally,
the fact that the perceived relative and absolute PM task
importance was comparable between the loss-frame and the
no-frame conditions further challenges the model, because a
basic assumption of the model is that value-induced processing
changes should be due to changes in perceived importance of
intention fulfillment. The present results suggest, however, that
intention-importance changes cannot fully explain the present
results.
Nevertheless, we find the goal-based motivational-cognitive
model to be a fruitful perspective on studying the dynamics
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of PM. Importantly, this model is the only motivational model
proposed to explain motivational influences in PM. The model
makes some clear predictions, which are also supported by data.
Other aspects of the model are not as clear. Especially, the
model does not consider that intention value could affect global
attention allocation policies that are assumed to be established
early during intention encoding based on metacognitive beliefs
about task demands (Meeks et al., 2007; Rummel and Meiser,
2013; Rummel et al., 2013). Further, the dual-task nature
of intentions suggests that attention-allocation policies may
cause global changes in attention allocated to the entire task
set or specific changes to the components of the task set.
Marsh et al. (2005) have already made this argument for how
the task demands might influence how participants allocate
attention to the entire PM-task/ongoing-task set. The goal-
based motivational-cognitive model only indicates attention
allocated to the PM task. We understand that Penningroth and
Scott (2007) believe that attention is already allocated toward
some ongoing task and that their view of attentional allocation
relates specifically to how attention is re-allocated toward the
PM task and away from the ongoing task. Arguments for
these attentional tradeoffs are rooted in theories of effortful
processing and limited available resources (Navon and Gopher,
1979; Cowan et al., 2005) with which we generally agree. If
our framing manipulations increased attention toward the PM
task only, and that attention was allocated away from the
ongoing task in favor of the PM task, we would expect to find
attentional tradeoffs in terms of increased PM-induced costs.
We did not, however, find such tradeoffs in either experiment.
What is missing from the model is specification about how
attention is allocated toward the overall task set (cf. Marsh et al.,
2005).
Even though there might have been some changes in the
recruitment of attentional resources for words processed in
the framing conditions compared with the control condition,
these changes are unlikely to completely explain the increased
PM performance in the framing conditions because they were
small. Further, they were not statistically reliable despite a
good statistical power, which was higher than the power
for the (significant) PM-performance comparisons. Thus, an
alternative interpretation of our data is somewhat predicated
on the possibility that attention allocated by participants in
the no-frame control condition undermined their full potential,
whereas the framing manipulations facilitated the recruitment of
additional attentional resources that were otherwise not recruited
by control participants.
The foregoing analysis highlights the possibility that certain
value-added intentions may motivate participants to allocate
more attention to the overall task set. Greater allocation of
attention to the entire task set rather than to one component task
could explain the increase in event-based cue detection in the
framing conditions paired with the absence of a compensational
increase in task interference. Perhaps clarifying the monetary
promise as we did in Experiment 2 caused improvements for
all conditions in that experiment. Although we do not have
data to suggest that participants in our value-frame conditions
allocated more attention toward the entire task set than those in
the no-frame condition, the benefit for value-added intentions
in the absence of attentional tradeoffs is very intriguing.
A limited understanding of motivational influences on PM
warrants connecting our results with other research areas that
have studied motivational mechanisms related to attention. A
distinction between actual motivation and potential motivation
is not new (Brehm and Self, 1989). According to the theory
of motivation intensity, various determinants can affect the
effort, or potential motivation, one is willing to allocate in
order to satisfy a motive and that motivation ‘‘is created
by needs and/or potential outcomes and the expectation that
performance of a behavior will affect those needs and outcomes’’
(Brehm and Self, 1989, p. 111). In our experiments, the value
frames represent the determinants that can influence motivation.
Similar findings have been shown in reward domains (Mowen
et al., 1981; Marien et al., 2014). In a recent study, Marien
et al. (2014) used small monetary rewards for trials in a
modality-shift paradigm and found evidence for changes in
potential motivation when the difficulty of the task called
for changes in adaptive control. Their effect was larger on
crossmodal trials (e.g., visual-auditory) for which participants
directed attention to a different modality than on ipsimodal trials
(e.g., visual-visual). Others have also shown that motivational
incentives and adaptive control can engage proactive control
and brain activity in the prefrontal cortex and reward-related
regions (Locke and Braver, 2008; Chiew and Braver, 2011;
Marien et al., 2013) and have linked adaptive control to
PM (cf. Braver, 2012), suggesting its importance in executing
intentions.
An attentional shift and activation of the components of an
intention may be vital for responding to PM cues (West and
Craik, 1999; Marsh et al., 2002) which may be moderated by
some form of adaptive control. In the absence of unambiguous
experimental data, we are careful not to claim that a change in
potential motivation accounts for our findings, but because of
the similarities between attentional shifting in the modality-shift
paradigm and that of detecting cues embedded in a PM task, we
suggest this form of adaptive control is a testable explanation for
future research.
Motivation appears to influence the completion of intentions
in various ways. We used the goal-based motivational-cognitive
model to help understand the role of motivation in the context
of value-added intentions. Our data are both consistent and
inconsistent with this model’s predictions. Unlike other models
of PM that have been scrutinized and modified after ensuing
years of scientific rigor, this model has not been tested to
the same degree. In light of our findings, there may be some
modifications of the model that might allow for it to better
account for various types of data and intentions. We do,
however, realize that our considerations to the model have not
been scrutinized and are tentative. After all, our interpretations
are limited to a subset of experiments designed to examine
the influence of a 4e gain or loss frame associated with
detecting PM cues that we embedded in the context of word-
nonword ongoing activities for an event-based intention. The
literature on PM is vast and contains many different forms of
intentions (e.g., activity-based, event-based, time-based), which
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may differ in processing demands and may be influenced
differently by monetary gains or losses. Nevertheless, we have
replicated and extended the research on incentives in the
domain of PM and believe that fruitful avenues for investigation
exist for both basic and applied domains of inquiry on these
value-added intentions, which undoubtedly affect each and
everyone one of us.
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